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Clark-Weintraub: The Use of Videotaped Testimony of Victims in Cases Involving Chi

NOTE

THE USE OF VIDEOTAPED TESTIMONY OF
VICTIMS IN CASES INVOLVING CHILD SEXUAL
ABUSE: A CONSTITUTIONAL DILEMMA
The more afield we get, the more nervous I am that some poor
innocent guy will go down the tubes.

Robert H. Lynn, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis"
[T]he protection of children, as far as I am concerned, is as important a right. And I believe that videotaping children's testimony is extremely important especially in the tender years.
Jeanine Pirro, Assistant District Attorney, White Plains, New
2
York
INTRODUCTION
3
Reports of child sexual abuse are increasing at alarming rates.
Child victims of sexual abuse not only suffer the painful mental and
physical consequences of the abuse itself, but also the trauma of participating in a judicial system that seems at times to sacrifice the

well-being of the victim to protect the constitutional rights of the

defendant.

As a result, many parents are reluctant to follow

1. Statement quoted in Galante, New War On Child Abuse: Reforms Are Making Prosecutions Easier, Nat'l L.J., June 25, 1984, at 28, col. 4.
2. Statement quoted in ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE, FINAL REPORT, Sept. 1984, at 39 [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT].
3. Galante, supra note 1, at 26, col. 1.
4. See generally TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2 (recommending various reforms
designed to ease the fear the child victim experiences when testifying against his or her
attacker).
Recognition of the added suffering child sexual abuse victims experience at the hands of
the judicial system is a relatively recent development, however. The plight of the child victim
of sexual abuse testifying against the alleged perpetrator first received attention in legal literature in Libai, The Protectionof the Child Victim of a Sexual Offense in the Criminal Justice
System, 15 WAYNE L. REV.977 (1969). Libai's article proposed a number of reforms to protect the child witness from "legal process trauma," id. at 1009, including: (1) the use of specially trained "child examiners" who would have the exclusive right to question the child about
the abuse during the investigatory phase of the criminal proceeding, id. at 986-1003; (2) when-
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through on their initial complaint since it would subject their child
to the ordeal of telling and re-telling the details of the abuse to police officers, prosecutors, grand juries, and finally a courtroom full of
strangers as the case slowly winds through the judicial system.6 At
the same time, prosecutors are frequently reluctant to proceed to
trial when the only evidence against the accused is the testimony of
the child victim because young children are generally perceived as
being ineffective and unreliable witnesses.6
Growing public awareness of child sexual abuse and the
problems the judicial process poses for the child victims, their parents, and prosecutors led many states to alter their rules of evidence
and criminal procedure in cases involving molestation of young children.7 Some states replaced statutes declaring children below a cerever possible, the use of a special hearing before trial at which the child's testimony would be
videotaped for presentation at trial so that the child could forget the abuse as soon as possible,
Id. at 1028-32; (3) in those cases where the child would testify at trial, the use of a special
"Child-Courtroom." Id. at 1014-25. In the "Child-Courtroom," only the child, the judge, the
prosecutor, and the defense counsel would be present during the child's testimony. The defendant, the jury, and spectators would be seated behind a one-way mirror and the defendant
would have electronic means of communicating with counsel during the child's testimony. Id.
at 1017.
Libai's proposals were later endorsed and refined in Parker, The Rights of Child Witnesses: Is the Court a Protectoror Perpetrator?,17 NEw ENG. L. REV. 643 (1982). Parker
proposed a "Model Act To Protect Child Witnesses" that carried Libai's proposals beyond the
context of child sex abuse cases to all instances where a child is called to testify, including tort
actions and child custody or divorce proceedings. Id. at 643-74.
Unlike the United States, many foreign countries have long recognized that child victims
who appear as witnesses in criminal proceedings should receive special treatment. See Libai,
supra, at 986-1001. See also Reifen, Protection of Children Involved in Sexual Offenses: A
New Method of Investigation in Israel, 49 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sc. 222
(1958) (discussing early Israeli reforms protecting child sex abuse victims).
5. See Libai, supra note 4, at 984; Parker, supra note 4, at 651.
6. Galante, supra note 1, at 26, col. 1.
7. Id. at 1, col. I. Increasing concern about the problems of child sexual abuse and
family violence in the United States led to the appointment of the Attorney General's Task
Force on Family Violence in 1983. The nine-member panel heard testimony from over one
thousand witnesses - victims, experts, and law enforcement personnel - during hearings held
in six major American cities. Brozan, Task Force Urges Action Against Family Violence,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1984, at A25, col. 1. The panel's Final Report was released in September 1984. It contained numerous recommendations for law enforcement personnel, prosecutors,
and judges concerning the procedure that should be employed in handling family violence and
child sexual abuse cases.
Emphasizing the frightening ordeal the child victim faces in testifying, the Task Force
recommended adoption of many of the recent liberalizations in some states' rules of evidence
and criminal procedure in child sexual abuse prosecutions. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2,
at 10-43. The Task Force strongly advocated the use of videotaped testimony of child sex
abuse victims at trial in lieu of live testimony in open court. Id. at 32, 39. Specifically, the
panel approved use of a procedure that had been employed in a Colorado prosecution for child
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tain age incompetent to testify with statutes leaving the determination of the child's competency to the discretion of the trial judge.'

Other states eliminated corroboration requirements in cases involv-

ing child sexual abuse.9 New exceptions to the hearsay rule' were

adopted which allow testimony concerning the child victim's out-ofcourt statements into evidence," or allow the child's testimony to be

12
videotaped and shown at trial.
In recent years, a number of states, including Arizona, 3 Arkan4
sas,1 California, 15 Colorado,' 6 Florida,' 7 Indiana,28 Kentucky,' 9
Maine, ° Montana,2 ' New Mexico,22 New York, 3 South Dakota, 4

sexual abuse. Id. at 137, n.10. In that case, the prosecutor obtained the defendant's consent to
a procedure wherein the prosecutor, the defendant, and defense counsel sat behind one-way
glass during the child's testimony while an interviewer, who wore an earpiece that allowed him
to hear questions suggested by the prosecutor and defense attorney, questioned the child. The
interview was videotaped for presentation at trial. Id.
8. Galante, supra note 1, at 26, col. 3. At common law, children under the age of
fourteen were presumed incompetent to testify. A number of jurisdictions continue to adhere
to this common law rule. However, the majority of jurisdictions have altered the common law
rule by either lowering the age of presumed incompetency to ten and under, or leaving the
determination of the child's competency as a witness to the discretion of the trial judge in
accordance with certain stated standards. Annot., 35 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2d 665, 672
(1983).
9. Galante, supra note 1, at 1, col. 2.
10. See infra notes 65-74 and accompanying text.
11. E.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1228 (West Supp. 1986); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25129
(Supp. 1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-6 (West Supp. 1985); KAN.. STAT. ANN. § 60460(dd) (Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(3) (West Supp. 1986); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 19-16-38 (Supp. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-411 (Supp. 1985); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.120 (West Supp. 1986).
12.

Statutes allowing the child's out-of-court statements into evidence at trial provide,

for example, that a child's statements about the abuse made to his or her parents or physician
following the attack are admissible into evidence at trial. See supra note 11. The videotape
statutes, on the other hand, provide that the child's actual trial testimony can be videotaped
for use at trial. See infra notes 13-26.
13. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4251 to -4253 (Supp. 1985) (replacing ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 12-2311 to -2312 (1978)).
14. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2036 (Supp. 1985).
15. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1346 (West Supp. 1986).
16. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-413 (Supp. 1984).
17. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.53 (West Supp. 1986).
18. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-6 (West Supp. 1985).
19. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.350 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1984).
20. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1205 (West Supp. 1985) (amending ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, § 1205 (West Supp. 1984-85)).
21. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-15-401 to -403 (1985).
22. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-17 (Supp. 1985).
23. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW. § 190.32 (Consol. 1986).
24. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-12-9 to -10 (Supp. 1985).
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Texas, 25 and Wisconsin, 26 have enacted statutes which allow the testimony of child sexual abuse victims to be videotaped for use at various stages of the judicial process. This procedure spares the child
victim the ordeal of testifying about the abuse in open court. In addition, taping the child's testimony early in the proceedings eliminates the need for the child to continually recount the traumatic details of the abuse thereby facilitating the child's recovery.
Although the use of videotaped testimony may significantly ease
the child's burden in testifying, serious questions arise concerning
the constitutionality of such a procedure.2 8 A videotape of a child
victim's testimony is a form of hearsay. 29 The admission of hearsay
evidence at a criminal trial must be reconciled with a defendant's
sixth amendment "right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses
against him . . . ."3 In a long line of decisions, the Supreme Court

has attempted to set forth standards to govern the admissibility of
hearsay evidence consistent with the sixth amendment's confrontation guarantee. 31 Defendants and their attorneys argue that admission of videotaped testimony of child sex abuse victims is unconstitutional because the taped testimony does not meet these standards set
forth by the Court, thereby denying the defendant his sixth amendment right to confrontation.3 2 Prosecutors, on the other hand, argue
that such videotaped testimony is a constitutionally admissible form
of hearsay that satisfies the major purposes behind the sixth amendment's confrontation guarantee. 33
This Note examines the content of representative statutes that
allow the testimony of child victims of sexual abuse to be videotaped
for presentation at trial.34 The procedures prescribed by these stat25. TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 38.071 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
26. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 967.04(7)(b), 967.041-.043 (1985 & West Supp. 1985).
27. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 38; Libai, supra note 4, at 1028, 1030,
1032; Parker, supra note 4, at 653, 669; Galante, supra note 1, at 28, col. 1.

28. Galante, supra note 1, at 28, col. 1.
29. See Infra note 65 and accompanying text.
30. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
31. See infra notes 75-114 and accompanying text.
32. See Galante, supra note 1, at 28, col. 1. In addition, there is the question of whether
the videotape statutes, even if valid under the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution where the face-to-face requirement is ambiguous, are valid under the stricter provisions of
certain state constitutions that specifically call for a face-to-face encounter between the defendant and his accusers. E.g., ARIz. CoNsT. art. II, § 24; COLO. CoNsT. art. II, § 16; MONT.
CoNsT. art. II, § 24; S.D. CONsT. art. VI, § 7; WIs. CoNsT. art. I, § 7. Such an inquiry is
beyond the scope of this Note.
33. See Galente, supra note 1, at 28, col. 1.
34. See Infra text accompanying notes 36-63.
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utes are analyzed in order to determine whether they meet the stan-

dards set forth in the Supreme Court's decisions concerning the constitutionality of exceptions to the hearsay rule in light of the
confrontation clause.35
I.

THE VIDEOTAPE STATUTES

Since 1977, several states have enacted statutes allowing the

testimony of child victims of sexual abuse to be videotaped for use at

trial.38 All but one of the statutes place an age limit on the use of the

videotape procedure.3 7 The statutes also differ in three other important respects: (1) the findings that must be made in order to have the
child's testimony preserved on videotape prior to trial; (2) the procedures that must be followed when the child's testimony is videotaped; and (3) the findings that must be made in order to have the
tape admitted into evidence at trial.38
35. See infra text accompanying notes 143-220.
36. See supra notes 13-26 and accompanying text.
37. Compare ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4251 (Supp. 1985) ("a person under fifteen
years of age"); with ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2036 (Supp. 1985) ("any alleged victim under the
age of seventeen (17) years"); with CAL. PENAL CODE ] 13416(a) (West Supp. 1986) ("where
the victim is a person 15 years of age or less"); with COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-413(1) (Supp.
1984) ("when the victim at the time of the commission of the act is a child less than fifteen
years of age"); with FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.53(1) (West Supp. 1986) ("a victim or witness who
is under the age of 16"); with IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-6(b)(1) (West Supp. 1985) ("[a]
statement or videotape. . . made by a child who was under ten (10) years of age at the time
of the statement or videotape"); with KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.350(1) (Bobbs-Merrill Supp.
1984) ("when the act is alleged to have been committed against a child twelve (12) years of
age or younger"); with ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1205 (West Supp. 1985) ("[a] hearsay
statement made by a person under the age of 14 years"); with N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-17(A)
(1984) ("any alleged victim under the age of sixteen years"); and N.M. DIST. CT. R. 29.1
("complaint in district court charging a criminal sexual penetration or criminal sexual contact
on a child under thirteen years of age"); with S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-12-9 (Supp.
1985) ("where the victim is less than sixteen years of age"); with TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE
ANN. art. 38.071, § 1 (Vernon Supp. 1986) ("an offense. . . alleged to have been committed
against a child 12 years of age or younger"); with Wis. STAT ANN. § 967.04(7)(a)-(b) (West
1985) (incorporating by reference § 950.02(1) (West Supp. 1985) ("a person who is less than
18 years of age.")).
Two of the states, Montana and New York, have no such age limitations. Under Montana's statute, any victim of a sexual offense, with the concurrence of the prosecutor, can
request that his or her testimony be videotaped for use at trial. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-15401 (1985). While New York's statute specifically applies to children twelve years of age and
under, N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 190.32(1)(a) (Consol. 1986), the statute is also triggered
where a witness older than twelve years is "likely to suffer very severe emotional or mental
stress if required to testify in person." Id. § 190.32(1)(b)(ii).
38. New York's recently enacted videotape statute allows the taping of the child witness'
testimony for presentation to the grand jury in lieu of having the child appear at that proceeding. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 190.32(2) (Consol. 1986). Unlike other states, however, New
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A.

Ordering the Taping

At least eight videotape statutes do not require that the court
make a specific finding regarding the child's ability to testify at trial
before ordering that the child's testimony be taped.3 9 These statutes

usually provide only that the child's testimony will be taped upon
request or motion by the prosecutor or victim. 4 0 At least five video-

tape statutes provide that the child's testimony can be taped prior to
trial only if the court finds that the child is likely to suffer some
degree of emotional harm if required to appear in court.41 Both the
Colorado and Wisconsin statutes suggest what types of evidence the

court should consider in making this determination.

2

Colorado's

statute provides that this determination "shall be based on, but not

limited to, recommendations from the child's therapist or any other
person having direct contact with the child, whose recommendations
are based on specific behavioral indicators exhibited by the child. 43
The Wisconsin statute requires a pre-trial hearing to determine the
likely effect of testifying on the child's well-being. The child is not
required to testify at this hearing, nor to submit to an examination of
his or her mental or emotional condition.4 5 However, the guidelines
York law has no provision for the use of such a tape at the actual trial. Id. § 190.32.
39. See ARMz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4253 (Supp. 1985); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2036
(Supp. 1985); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1346 (West Supp. 1986); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-6
(West Supp. 1985); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.350(4) (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1984); MoNT.
REV. CODE ANN. § 46-15-401 (1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-12-9 (Supp. 1985);
TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 38.071, § 4 (Vernon Supp. 1986). The Indiana statute,
unlike the others in this category, makes no mention of the child's testimony being taped pursuant to a court order.
40. See statutes cited supra notes 13-26. One of.these statutes provides, however, that
the request or motion will be granted only "for a good cause shown." ARK. STAT. ANN. § 432036 (Supp. 1985). Although the New Mexico videotape statute also contains this "good
cause" language, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-17(A) (1984), the district court rule implementing
the statute requires "a showing that the child may be unable to testify without suffering unreasonable and unnecessary mental or emotional harm." N.M. DIST. CT. R. 29.1(a).
41. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-413(3) (Supp. 1984) ("medically unavailable or otherwise
unavailable" within the meaning of the state's hearsay rule); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.53(1)
(West Supp. 1986) ("substantial likelihood [of] . . . at least moderate emotional or mental
harm"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1205(1) (West Supp. 1985) ("the mental or physical
well-being of that person will more likely than not be harmed"); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
967.04(7)(b) (West 1985) ("a substantial likelihood [of] . . . severe emotional or mental
strain"); N.M. DIST. CT. R. 29.1(a) ("unable to testify without suffering unreasonable and
unnecessary mental or emotional harm").
42. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-413(3) (Supp. 1984); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 967.041 (West
Supp. 1985).
43. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-413(3) (Supp. 1984).
44. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 967.041(1) (West Supp. 1985).
45. Id. § 967.041(2).
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suggest that the court consider whether the child "has manifested
symptoms associated with post-traumatic stress disorder or other
46
mental disorders.
B.

The Videotaping Procedure

Most of the statutes that allow tapes to be used as evidence at
trial in lieu of the child's live testimony require that the judge, the
prosecutor, the defendant, the defendant's counsel, and the child victim be present at the taping, and that the defendant have a full opportunity to cross-examine the child victim witness. 7 In fact, at least
two of these statutes specify that it is the child's preliminary hearing
testimony that is to be taped. 48 Other statutes provide for a special
taping session, for example, in the judge's chambers, with all of the
above parties present.
Three states, Arizona, Kentucky, and Texas, apparently mindful of the child sexual abuse victim's distress at having to physically
46. Id. § 967.041(3)(h).
47. ARK. STAT. ANN., § 43-2036 (Supp. 1985); CAL PENAL CODE § 1346 (West Supp.
1986) (incorporating by reference CAL. PENAL CODE § 865 (West 1985) (examination of witnesses at preliminary hearing must take place in the presence of the accused) and CAL PENAL
CODE § 1043.5 (West 1985) (defendant shall be personally present at preliminary hearing));
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-413 (Supp. 1984) (incorporating by reference COLO. R. CRiM. PROC.
15(d)); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.53(3), (4) (West Supp. 1986) (The Florida statute provides,
however, that the presence of the judge may be waived if each party so stipulates and that the
defendant may waive his right and the right of his counsel to be present. Also, the court may
require the defendant to view testimony of the child by way of a two way mirror.); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1205(2) (West Supp. 1985) (the statement must be made "subject to all
of the rights of confrontation secured, to an accused by the Constitution of Maine or the
United States Constitution and. . . in the presence of a judge or justice"); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 46-15-402(2) (1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-17(A) (1984); N.M. DIST. CT. R. 29.1 (b)(2)(3); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-12-9 (Supp. 1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 967.04(7)(b)
(West 1985). Although the Wisconsin statute provides that "[t]he judge may specify. . . who
may be present when the deposition is taken," unlike the Texas and Kentucky statutes it does
not specifically provide that there need not be a physical confrontation between the child victim and the accused when the deposition is taken. Id. Compare id. (does not mandate that the
defendant be present or isolated during the testimony) with ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 134253(B) (Supp. 1985); Ky. REV.STAT. ANN. § 421.350(4) (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1984) and
TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 38.071, § 4 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (defendant prohibited
from being in the same room). But cf IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-6 (West Supp. 1985). The
Indiana statute makes no mention of the child's testimony being taped pursuant to a court
order. Id.
48. CAL PENAL CODE § 1346(a), (c) (West Supp. 1986); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. §
23A-12-9 (Supp. 1985).
49. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2036 (Supp. 1985); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-413 (Supp.
1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1205(2) (West Supp. 1985); MONT.CODE ANN. 46-15402 (1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-17(A) (Supp. 1984); N.M. DIST. CT. R. 29.1(b)(2); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 967.042(2)(b) (Vest Supp. 1985).
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confront an "attacker" during judicial proceedings, adopted a novel
procedure to be used when videotaping the child's testimony. These
three statutes5" provide that during the taping only the prosecutor,

defense attorneys, operators of the video equipment, and "any person
whose presence would contribute to the welfare and well-being" of1
the child may be present in the room during the child's testimony.
The equipment operators, however, must remain hidden from the
52
child behind a one-way screen or mirror or in an adjacent room.
These statutes also provide that the defendant shall be permitted to
hear and observe the child's testimony "in person," but like the
equipment operators, the defendant may not be seen or heard by the
child witness.53
50. See ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4253 (Supp. 1985); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
421.350 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1984); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 38.071 (Vernon Supp.
1986). The three statutes are substantially identical. The Texas statute was apparently the
model for the other two. Kentucky's statute was passed a year after Texas adopted its statute.
Arizona, which had enacted one of the earliest videotape statutes, ARZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
12-2311 to -2312 (1978), repealed its statute in 1985 and replaced it with one that was nearly
a verbatim copy of the Kentucky and Texas statutes. In 1985, Florida amended its statute to
provide that "[t]he court may require the defendant to view the testimony from outside the
presence of the child by means of a two-way mirror or another similar method that will ensure
that the defendant can observe and hear the testimony of the child in person, but that the child
cannot hear or see the defendant. The defendant and the attorney for the defendant may
communicate by any appropriate private method." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.53(4) (West Supp.
1986).
51. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4253(B) (Supp. 1985); Ky. REV. CODE ANN. §
421.350(3) (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1984); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 38.071, § 3
(Vernon Supp. 1986).
52. See statutes cited supra note 51.
53. AMz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4253(B) (Supp.1985); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
421.350(4) (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1984); TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 38.071, § 4
(Vernon Supp. 1986). The videotape procedure described in the Arizona, Kentucky, and Texas
statutes is just one of a number of reforms those state legislatures adopted concerning the
testimony of child victim witnesses. The statutes also provide that recordings of the child's
statements to a third-party interviewer made prior to the commencement of the proceedings
may be admitted into evidence despite the fact that neither the prosecutor nor defense counsel
were present at the time the statements were made. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4252 (Supp.
1985); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.350(2) (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1984); TEx. CRIM. PROC.
CODE ANN, art. 38.071, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1986). If such statements are admitted into evidence, however, both the third-party interviewer and the child must be available if called to
testify at trial and be cross-examined. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4252 (Supp. 1985); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.350(2)(f), (h) (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1984); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE
ANN, art. 38.071, § 2(a)(6), (b) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
A recent decision of the Texas Court of Appeals upheld the admission of such a videotape
at the trial of a man convicted of aggravated sexual abuse of his seven-year-old stepdaughter.
Jolly v. State, 681 S.W.2d 689, 692, 697 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (petition for discretionary
review granted). On appeal, the defendant alleged thirteen grounds of error, nine of which
related to the court's admission of a videotape of an interview between the child and a child-
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Admitting the Videotaped Testimony Into Evidence At Trial
Under most of the statutes, the findings that must be made

before the videotaped testimony is admissible as evidence at trial
correspond to the findings that must be made initially in order to
have the child's testimony taped. For example, statutes that do not
require that the court make a specific finding regarding the child's
ability to testify at trial before ordering the taping" usually provide
simply that such a tape, once made, shall be admissible as evidence
at trial; however, those statutes usually do not explain the circumstances necessary for admission of the tape as evidence. 55 The Kentucky58 and Texas 57 statutes, which allow the child's testimony to be
placement specialist for the Texas Department of Human Resources. Id. at 695. One of the
grounds for error was that admission of the tape violated the defendant's right to confront and
cross-examine the child. Id. The court rejected this reasoning, noting that the statute specifically allows the showing of such a tape so long as the child is available to testify at trial. Id.
The court pointed out that in this case the child was available to be called and cross-examined
at trial, but that the defendant had not done so. Id. Two other Texas courts of appeal concurred with the Jolly decision. Tolbert v. State, 697 S.W.2d 795 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985); Alexander v. State, 692 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985).
However, another panel of the Texas Court of Appeals found TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE
ANN. art. 38.071, § 2 prima facie unconstitutional. Long v. State, 694 S.W.2d 185 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1985). This court rejected the argument that the provision in the statute allowing either
party to call the child to testify at trial saves it from constitutional infirmity on confrontation
grounds.
The Arizona, Kentucky, and Texas statutes also provide that the child's testimony may be
taken outside the courtroom and televised by closed circuit television back into the courtroom
to be viewed by the jury and spectators. The procedure followed here would be identical to
that under the section of the statute noted in the text above. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 134253(A) (Supp. 1985); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.350(3) (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1984); TEx.
CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 38.071, § 3 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
54. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
55. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-4253(B) (Supp. 1985); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2036
(Supp. 1985); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 421.350(4) (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1984); MoNT. CODE
ANN. § 46-15-401 (1985); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE art. 38.071, § 4 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
The two statutes providing for taping of the child's preliminary hearing testimony upon
request of the prosecutor, however, require a finding that testifying at trial will be likely to
cause emotional or mental trauma to the child before the tape may be admitted into evidence
at trial in lieu of the child's live testimony. CAL PENAL CODE § 1346(d) (Vest Supp. 1986);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-12-9 (Supp. 1985). Likewise, Indiana's statute requires that
the court find the child unavailable to testify based upon (1) the certification of a psychiatrist
that testifying would be a traumatic experience for the child, (2) the certification of a physician that the child cannot testify for medical reasons, or (3) the determination of the court
that the child is incapable of understanding the oath. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-6(c)(2)
(West Supp. 1985). However, the statute also provides that if the child is found unavailable to
testify for any of these reasons, the videotape cannot be admitted into evidence at trial unless
"there is corroborative evidence of that act that was allegedly committed against the child."
Id. § 35-37-4-6(d).
56. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421. 350(4) (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1984).
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taped merely upon the request of the prosecutor, and which have the
most liberal provisions regarding the videotaping procedure, provide
that if the court orders the child's testimony to be taped "the child
may not be required to testify in court at the proceeding for which
the testimony was taken." 58 The substantially identical Arizona statute, on the other hand, states that if the child's testimony is taped by
order of the court prior to trial, the child "shall not be required to
testify" at trial.59 It is unlikely that this slight difference in wording
indicates an intent on the part of the Kentucky and Texas legislatures to allow the child to potentially be called as a witness at trial.
Another section of these two statutes provides that a recording of a
child victim's conversation with a third party interviewer may be admitted into evidence at trial.60 This section of the Kentucky and
Texas statutes provides that if such a tape is admitted at trial, the
child and the interviewer may be called to testify by either party."'
Thus, the use of the words "may not" in the videotape section of the
Kentucky and Texas statutes seems to indicate an intent on the part
of those state legislatures to foreclose the opportunity of calling the
child to testify at trial if the child's testimony is videotaped prior to
trial pursuant to the statute. Thus, there seems to be no difference in
meaning in this respect among the Arizona; Kentucky, and Texas
statutes.
Usually, those statutes requiring an initial finding of emotional
or mental trauma before the child's testimony can be videotaped also
impose such a requirement
at the time of trial before the tape can be
62
admitted into evidence.
Of the five videotape statutes requiring a finding of emotional
harm to the child either before the deposition is taped or before the
tape is admitted into evidence at trial, four explicitly link such a
finding to unavailability within the meaning of the state's hearsay
rule by providing that the tape can be admitted under the prior testi57.
58,

TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 38.071, § 4 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
Ky. REV.STAT. ANN. § 421.350(5) (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1984); TEX. CRIM. PROC.

art. 38.071, § 5 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (emphasis added).
59. ARZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4253(C) (Supp. 1985) (emphasis added).
60. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.350(2) (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1984); TEx. CRIM. PROC.
CODE ANN. art. 38.071, § 2(a) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
CODE ANN.

61.

Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 421.350(2)(h) (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1984); TEx. CRIM.

PROC. CODE ANN. art. 38.071, § 2(b) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
62. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-413(4) (Supp. 1984); ME. REV.

STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §
1205(l) (West Supp. 1985); N.M. DisT. CT. R. 29.1. Cf. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.53(1), (5)
(West Supp. 1986); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 967.04(7)(b) (West 1985) (Wisconsin's videotape stat-

ute leaves the admission of the tape at trial to the discretion of the court.).
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mony hearsay exception.
II. THE

A.

3

SUPREME COURT'S CONFRONTATION

DECISIONS

Tension Between Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule and the
Confrontation Clause

The major Supreme Court decisions regarding the requirements
of the confrontation clause raise the question of what types of hearsay can be admitted into evidence against a defendant in a criminal
trial without violating the sixth amendment right to confrontation.6
The Federal Rules of Evidence define hearsay as "a statement, other
than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." 65
Hearsay evidence has generally been regarded as untrustworthy and
unreliable because the declarant was most likely not under oath at
the time the statement was made, and is not present at trial to be
cross-examined regarding the statement. 6 In addition, admission of
such an out-of-court statement deprives the jury of the opportunity
to observe the declarant's demeanor. Thus, hearsay evidence has
traditionally been held to be inadmissible at trial.
Not all hearsay evidence is inadmissible at trial, however. At
common law, numerous exceptions to the general prohibition against
hearsay evidence developed, and the modern trend is toward acceptance of a greater number of hearsay exceptions.6 8 For example, the
Federal Rules of Evidence recognize twenty-nine exceptions to the
hearsay rule.69 Some exceptions to the hearsay rule are allowed despite the fact that the declarant is available to testify at trial.70 Such
hearsay statements are said to "possess circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness sufficient to justify nonproduction of the declarant in
person at the trial even though he may be available." 7 1 Other hearsay exceptions are allowed only if it is shown that the declarant is
63. CAL PENAL CODE § 1346(d) (West Supp. 1986); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-413(4)
(Supp. 1984); N.M. DisT. CT. R. 29.1(b); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-12-9 (Supp.
1985).
64. In Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965), the Supreme Court incorporated the
sixth amendment confrontation right into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
65. FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
66. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970).
67.. Id.
68. 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 193 (1964).
69. FED. R. EVID. 803 & 804.
70.

FED. R. EVID. 803.

71.

FED. R. EviD. 803 advisory committee note.
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unavailable to testify at trial.72 In these situations the hearsay evi-

dence, "if of the specified quality, is preferred over complete loss of
the evidence" due to the unavailability of the declarant.7 3 It is this
latter group of exceptions to the hearsay rule that present the most

difficulty in terms of confrontation, since there is
by definition no
74
way to procure the declarant's presence at trial.

Although the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the values protected by the hearsay rules and the confrontation clause are
not identical, 75 the Court has noted that confrontation eliminates the
major dangers associated with hearsay evidence:
Confrontation: (1) insures that the witness will give his statements
under oath-thus impressing him with the seriousness of the matter and guarding against the lie by the possibility of a penalty for
perjury; (2) forces the witness to submit to cross-examination, the
"greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth"; (3)
permits the jury that is to decide the defendant's fate to observe
the demeanor of the witness in making
his statement, thus aiding
76
the jury in assessing his credibility.

The problem of reconciling the numerous hearsay exceptions
with the dictates of the confrontation clause has troubled the Su-

preme Court. On its face the confrontation clause seems to preclude
77
the admission of any hearsay evidence in a criminal proceeding.
The Court, however, wary of "constitutionalizing" the hearsay rule
and its multiple exceptions, 78 has rejected such an interpretation of
the confrontation clause as too extreme and probably not intended
72. FED. R. EvID. 804.
73. FED. R. EviD. 804 advisory committee note.
74. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 (1970). In Green, the Court found that the
confrontation clause was not violated by the admission of prior inconsistent statements of a
witness made out of court, where the witness was present and testifying at trial. Id. at 164.
75. In Green, the Court noted that it would be erroneous to view the confrontation
clause as "nothing more or less than a codification of the rules of hearsay and their exceptions
as they existed historically at common law." Id. at 155. See also Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S.
74, 86 (1970) (plurality opinion) ("It seems apparent that the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause and the evidentiary hearsay rule stem from the same roots. But this Court has
never equated the two, and we decline to do so now.").
76. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (footnote omitted) (quoting 5 J. WiaMORE, EVIDENCE § 1367 (3d ed. 1940)).
77. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980).
78. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970). See generally Read, The New
Confrontation-HearsayDilemma, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 2 (1972) (arguing that the Court's
identification of the right of cross-examination as the core value protected by the confrontation
clause can be seen as giving the hearsay rule "constitutional dimensions" since the right of
cross-examination is also the core value protected by the hearsay rule).
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by the Framers.1 9 Thus, under certain circumstances the Court has
found that the admission of hearsay evidence does not violate the
confrontation clause. The Court's failure, however, to set forth a definitive theory reconciling the hearsay rules and the dictates of the
confrontation clause has been widely criticized.80 The Court acknowledged this criticism in its most recent confrontation decision"'
but concluded that "no rule [would] perfectly resolve all possible
problems"' 2 and refused to set forth such a definitive theory.
What Are the Essential Elements of Confrontation?
1. Face-to-Face Meeting Between the Defendant and His Accusers. - The Supreme Court has never stated that face-to-face
confrontation between the defendant and his accuser is required at
all times and under all circumstances. In its decisions the Court has
recognized that the right to such a confrontation is not absolute and
can be waived or forfeited. 83 Nevertheless, the Court has stated that
the confrontation clause "reflects a preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial."84 The Supreme Court's earliest decisions interpreting the confrontation clause emphasize the usefulness of face-toface confrontation as a vehicle for testing the veracity of witnesses.85
For example, in Mattox v. United States,8 the first major Supreme
Court decision interpreting the confrontation clause, the Court
concluded:
The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was
to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits, such as were sometimes admitted in civil cases, being used against the prisoner in lieu
of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness in
which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recolB.

79. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243-44 (1895); California v. Green, 399
U.S. 149, 174-75 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
80. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 n.9 (1980).
81. Id. at 56.
82. Id. at 68 n.9 (quoting Natali, Green, Dutton, and Chambers: Three Cases in Search
of a Theory, 7 RUT.-CAM. L. J. 43, 73 (1975)).
83. See, e.g., Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970) (An accused party can be removed
from the courtroom during trial for disruptive behavior without violating his right to confrontation.); Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912) (An accused party not in custody can
waive his right to be present at trial.).
84. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980). In the case of videotaped testimony "the
issue becomes whether the accused has the right to 'eyeball-to-eyeball' confrontation." Galante, supra note 1, at 28, col. 2.
85. See Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325 (1911); Kirby v. United States, 174
U.S. 47 (1899); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
86. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
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lection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling
him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may
look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the
manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of
7

belief.

In Mattox, the defendant argued that his right to confrontation

was violated by the admission into evidence of the testimony of a
then deceased witness who had appeared and been cross-examined at
the defendant's first murder trial. The defendant was convicted at

this first trial, but the conviction was overturned on appeal. The
Court noted that although one could argue that a criminal defendant
should never be denied face-to-face confrontation with the witnesses
against him, 88 in certain instances the confrontation right would not
bar the admission of evidence of an unavailable witness where "public policy" or the "necessities of the case" require otherwise. 9 The
Court pointed to the traditional admissibility of dying declarations
as such an instance.90 The Court concluded that here, since the defendant had the full benefit of confrontation with the witness at his
first trial, the confrontation clause did not bar admission of the testimony from the prior trial. According to the Court, "[t]he substance
of the constitutional protection is preserved to the prisoner in the
advantage he has once had of seeing the witness face to face, and of
subjecting him to the ordeal of a cross-examination." 1
87. Id. at 242-43 (emphasis added).
88. Id. at 243.
89. Id. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973) ("[T]he right to confront
and to cross-examine ... may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate
interests in the criminal trial process.").
90. Id. at 243-44.
91. Id. at 244 (emphasis added). Four years later, in Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S.
47 (1899), the need for face-to-face confrontation with available witnesses was once again
emphasized. Id. at 55. The defendant in Kirby was charged with knowingly receiving property
stolen from the U.S. government. Id. at 48-49. In order to prove that the property Kirby was
charged with possessing had been stolen, the government introduced the convictions of the
three persons who had been found guilty of stealing the property-a method of proof approved
by the statute under which Kirby had been charged. Id. at 49. The Court found this provision
of the statute unconstitutional. Id. at 54-55.
[A] fact which can be primarily established only by witnesses cannot be proved
against an accused ... except by witnesses who confront him at the trial, upon
whom he can look while being tried, whom he is entitled to cross-examine, and
whose testimony he may impeach in every mode authorized by the established rules
governing the trial or conduct of criminal cases.
Id. at 55.
Twelve years later in Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325 (1911), the Court interpreted the confrontation provision of the Philippine Bill of Rights that had been modeled on
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2. Adequate Opportunity For Cross-Examination. - Mere
face-to-face confrontation between the defendant and his accusers,
however, is not enough to satisfy the dictates of the confrontation
clause. In fact, the Supreme Court's decisions seem to identify the
right to cross-examine witnesses as the essential element of confrontation. 2 For example, in Douglas v. Alabama,93 the Court found a
violation of the defendant's right to confrontation where the prosecution read into evidence a purported confession of the defendant's alleged accomplice in a murder. On the witness stand, the accomplice
had refused to answer any questions 94 invoking his fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, thus making it impossible for the
defendant to cross-examine him.9 5 Emphasizing the cross-examination purpose behind the confrontation clause, the Douglas Court
noted that "an adequate opportunity for cross-examination may
satisfy the [confrontation] clause even in the absence of physical
confrontation."'
Failure to provide an adequate opportunity for cross-examination also led to a finding of infringement of confrontation rights in
Pointer v. Texas.97 In Pointer, the Court found that the defendant's
right to confrontation was violated where the prosecution introduced
at trial the preliminary hearing testimony of a subsequently unavailable witness and the defendant, who was without counsel at the preliminary hearing, did not cross-examine the witness.9"
Similarly, in Davis v. Alaska,99 the Court held that the defendant's right to confrontation was violated where a state statute prohibited him from impeaching the witness' credibility with the latter's
prior juvenile offender conviction. Once again, the Court strongly
emphasized the cross-examination purpose behind the confrontation
the sixth amendment version. The Court emphasized the utility of face-to-face encounter between the defendant and his accusers:
This provision of the statute intends to secure the accused in the right to be tried, so

far as facts provable by witnesses are concerned, by only such witnesses as meet him
face to face at the trial, who give their testimony in his presence, and give to the

accused an opportunity of cross-examination.
Id. at 330.
92. See, e.g., Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16 (1974); Douglas v. Alabama, 380
U.S. 415, 418 (1965).
93. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).

94.

Id. at 416.

95.

Id. at 419.

96.

Id. at 418 (emphasis added).

97.

380 U.S. 400, 406-08 (1965).

98. Id. at 407-08.
99. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
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clause:
The main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for
the opponent the opportunity of cross-examination. The opponent
demands confrontation, not for the idle purpose of gazing upon the
witness, or of being gazed upon by him, but for the purpose of
cross-examination, which cannot be had except by the direct and
personal putting of questions and obtaining immediate answers.100
C. When Does the Admission of Hearsay Statements of an
Unavailable Witness Violate the Confrontation Clause?
As noted earlier, the most troublesome cases involving the interaction between the hearsay exceptions and the confrontation clause
involve the admission into evidence of hearsay statements of an outof-court declarant who is unavailable to testify at trial. 1°1 Hearsay
exceptions allowed despite the unavailability of the declarant are
few.10 2 Such hearsay statements deny both the opportunity for faceto-face encounter and cross-examination at trial and are carefully
03
scrutinized by the Court.1
The last major Supreme Court decision concerning the confrontation clause was Ohio v. Roberts. 0 In that ease the defendant was
being tried for forgery and use of stolen credit cards. At his preliminary hearing, the daughter of his alleged victims testified that she
had not given the defendant permission to use her parents' credit
cards or checks. At the defendant's trial, the daughter's whereabouts
100. Id. at 315-16 (quoting 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1395 (3d ed. 1940) (emphasis in
original)).
101. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
102. For example, under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the declarant is unavailable
where he:
(I) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from testifying
concerning the subject matter of his statement; or
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of his statement
despite an order of the court to do so; or
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of his statement; or
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or then
existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement has been unable
to procure his attendance .
by process or other reasonable means.
FED. R, EviD. 804(a).
Rule 804(b)(5) is a "catchall" provision which "provide[s] for treating new and presently
unanticipated situations which demonstrate a trustworthiness within the spirit of the specifically stated exceptions." FED. R. EviD. 803 advisory committee note.
103. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 162 (1970).
104. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
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were unknown, even to her parents, and the state introduced her pre-

liminary hearing testimony into evidence against the defendant. The
defendant objected that this violated his right to confrontation. The

Ohio Court of Appeals 05 and the Ohio Supreme Court 1 6 agreed
with the defendant and overturned his conviction. The Supreme
Court reversed, ruling that defendant's right to confrontation had
not been violated. 0 7
In Roberts, the Court noted the widespread commentary in le-

gal literature concerning the Court's approach to the confrontation/
hearsay problem up to that point.10 8 While eschewing the desirability
of a definitive theory reconciling the confrontation clause and the
hearsay rules, the Court stated that "a general approach to the prob-

lem [was] discernible."109 Under the "approach" announced by the
Court in Roberts:
105. Id. at 60. The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed on the theory that the prosecution
had not made the "good faith" effort required under Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25
(1968), to conclude that the witness was unavailable.
106. Id. at 60-61. The Ohio Supreme Court rejected the court of appeals' contention
that the prosecution had failed to make a "good faith" effort to produce the witness. Rather, it
ruled that the defendant's right to confrontation had been violated because the daughter had
been the defendant's witness at the preliminary hearing, and was thus not subject to his crossexamination.
107. Id. at 67-77.
108. Id. at 66 n.9. The Court's decision in Roberts followed by ten years its last previous
encounter with the confrontation/hearsay controversy in Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970)
(plurality opinion). The Court's decision in Dutton capped a string of confrontation decisions
that had begun five years earlier in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), where the Court
incorporated the sixth amendment confrontation right into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. After the Supreme Court's decisions in the cases between Pointer and
Dutton, it appeared that the hearsay statements of an unavailable witness were admissible
against a defendant in a criminal trial only if the prosecution made a "good faith" effort to
produce the witness at trial and either (1) the defendant had been afforded an adequate opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the time the statement was made, or (2) the statement
was of a type long recognized as admissible despite the absence of the witness, e.g., dying
declarations. See Read, supra note 78, at 8-11.
In Dutton, however, in a plurality opinion, the Court held that the defendant's right to
confrontation was not violated by the admission into evidence of the hearsay statements of an
out-of-court declarant where the prosecutor had made no showing of the declarant's unavailability and the defendant was not afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. 400
U.S. at 74. In Dutton, the defendant was charged with the murder of three police officers. Id.
at 76. During the trial the prosecution called as a witness one Shaw, who testified concerning a
statement made by one of the defendant's alleged accomplices that by implication pointed to
the defendant as the killer. Id. at 77. The Court seemed to find this hearsay admissible simply
because there was other overwhelming evidence pointing to the defendant as the killer. Id. at
87-90. The Dutton decision evoked much critical commentary from legal scholars who felt that
clear, consistent guidelines were needed in this area. See generally Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 n.9
(discussing some of the critical commentary directed at the Court's confrontation decisions).
109. Id. at 65.
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[W]hen a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at
trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he
is unavailable. Even then, his statement is admissible only if it
bears adequate "indicia of reliability." Reliability can be inferred
without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly
rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness. 110

Nevertheless, in a footnote"" citing its last previous decision on
the confrontation/hearsay problem, Dutton v. Evans,"2 the Roberts
Court noted that a showing of unavailability is not always a prerequisite to the admissibility of hearsay statements of an unavailable
witness. 1 3 In Dutton, the Court determined that the prosecution did
not have to establish the unavailability of the declarant since "the
'' 4
utility of trial confrontation [was] remote."
III. Is THE USE OF VIDEOTAPED TESTIMONY AT TRIAL
CONSTITUTIONAL?

A.

The Case Law

Although the Supreme Court has yet to consider the question of
whether the use of videotaped testimony in a criminal prosecution
violates the defendant's right to confrontation, the question has been
addressed in numerous lower court decisions.11 5 These decisions all10.

Id. at 66.
Ill. Id. at 65 n.7.
112. 400 U.S. 74 (1970) (plurality opinion).
113. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65 n.7.
114. Id. See Dutton, 400 U.S. at 87-89. "[T]he possibility that cross-examination of
[the witness] could conceivably have shown the jury that the statement, though made, might
have been unreliable was wholly unreal." Id. at 89.
115. United States v. King, 552 F.2d 833 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 966
(1977) (Videotaped depositions of two of the defendant's unindicted co-conspirators introduced
into evidence at trial. Witnesses unavailable to testify at trial because they were incarcerated
in Japan.); State v. Reid, 114 Ariz. 16, 559 P.2d 136 (1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
921 (1977) (Videotape testimony of pathologist admitted into evidence at defendant's trial for
murder. Witness unavailable to testify at trial because he was scheduled to be out of the
country.); State v. Melendez, 135 Ariz. 390, 661 P.2d 654 (Ct. App. 1982) (Videotaped testimony of the child sex abuse victim admitted into evidence at defendant's trial. Child found to
be unavailable to testify at trial because it was likely that she would become uncommunicative
if called to testify before the jury.); People v. Ware, 78 Cal. App. 3d 822, 144 Cal. Rptr. 354
(Ct. App. 1978) (Videotaped preliminary hearing testimony of victim of robbery and sexual
assault admitted into evidence at defendant's trial. Witness unavailable to testify at trial because she had returned to her home in Spain.); People v. Moran, 39 Cal. App. 3d 398, 114
Cal. Rptr. 413 (Ct. App. 1974) (Videotaped preliminary hearing testimony of witness who
helped conceal the bodies of two murder victims admitted into evidence at defendant's trial for
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most unanimously approve the use of videotaped depositions of unavailable witnesses at trial. The approving courts have analogized
videotaped depositions to preliminary hearing or prior trial testimony, 16 which has long been considered constitutionally admissible
at trial if the witness is truly unavailable to appear in person.3' 7 In
fact, the courts considered a videotape of an unavailable witness' testimony preferable to reading a transcript of the same testimony to
the jury. 18
Most of the videotape statutes operative in cases of child sexual
abuse were enacted only recently. 19 Therefore, there are very few
those murders. Witness unavailable to testify at trial since he was hospitalized and near death
from throat cancer at the start of the trial, and in fact died during the trial.); Hutchins v.
State, 286 So. 2d 244 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973) (Videotaped deposition of lab technician
admitted into evidence at defendant's trial for unlawful possession of narcotics.); State v. Jackson, 259 N.W.2d 796 (Iowa Sup. Ct. 1977) (Videotaped deposition of shooting victim admitted into evidence at defendant's trial for assault with intent to commit manslaughter. Witness
confined to a hospital with her injuries.); State v. Washington, 202 N.J. Super. 187, 494 A.2d
335 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985) (Videotaped deposition of armed robbery victim constitutionally admissible at trial. Victim suffered from severe cardiac condition and had had a heart
attack.); State v. Martinez, 95 N.M. 445, 623 P.2d 565 (1981) (Videotaped deposition of
eyewitness to murder admitted into evidence at defendant's trial for first-degree murder, aggravated robbery and larceny. Witness had died before trial.); People v. Winborne, 90 Misc.
2d 71, 394 N.Y.S.2d 769 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (Court ordered deposition of victim of attempted
robbery to be preserved on videotape for use at trial. Victim had enlisted in the army and was
likely to be unavailable to testify at trial.); State v. Allen, 94 Wash. 2d 860, 621 P.2d 143
(1980) (en banc) (Videotaped deposition of victim of robbery and kidnapping admitted into
evidence at defendant's trial. Witness found unavailable to testify at trial because he had been
commissioned by the army.); State v. Hewett, 86 Wash. 2d 487, 545 P.2d 1201 (1976) (en
banc) (Videotaped deposition of alleged victim admitted into evidence at defendant's trial for
robbery. Victim was an officer of a merchant ship and was scheduled to sail for Japan before
trial.). Contra Stores v. Alaska, 625 P.2d 820 (Alaska Sup. Ct. 1980) (Videotaped deposition
of examining physician of rape victim erroneously admitted into evidence at defendant's trial.
Court held that the prosecution failed to adequately demonstrate the witness' unavailability.);
People v. McDowell, 88 A.D.2d 522, 449 N.Y.S.2d 981 (Sup. Ct. 1982) (mem.) (Videotape of
conditional examination of complainant in defendant's trial for robbery erroneously admitted
where prosecution had not attempted to procure the complainant's presence at trial. Complainant was a member of the armed forces stationed in Germany. Court did not pass on the constitutional issue because the prosecution did not make the good faith, diligent effort required by
the criminal procedure law for admitting a conditional examination of a witness into evidence.); People v. Lamberty, 94 Misc. 2d 636, 405 N.Y.S.2d 599 (Sup. Ct. 1978) (Court
denied motion by prosecution to have the testimony of an eyewitness preserved on videotape
for use at trial. Held that the criminal procedure law did not grant the court discretion to take
testimony other than by stenographic means.).
116. See. e.g., State v. Reid, 114 Ariz. 16, 28, 559 P.2d 136, 148 (1976) (en banc), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 921 (1977); State v. Hewett, 86 Wash. 2d 487, 491-92, 545 P.2d 1201, 1204
(1976) (en banc).
117. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165 (1970).
118. See cases cited supra note 116.
119. See supra text accompanying note 36.
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reported decisions concerning their use.120 Only one case, State v.
Melendez, 121 considered the question of whether admitting videotaped testimony into evidence at trial pursuant to such a statute violated the defendant's right to confrontation. In Melendez, the defendant was convicted of molesting his six-year-old daughter. Prior
to trial, pursuant to Arizona's original videotape statute122 and over
the defendant's objections, the trial court granted the prosecutor's
motion to have the child's testimony videotaped for use at trial. The
child's testimony was taped in the presence of the defendant, the
defendant's attorney, the prosecutor, and the judge on December 31,
1981. The trial commenced on January 6, 1982.123 On appeal, the
court rejected the defendant's argument that his right to confrontation was violated by admission of the videotaped testimony, relying
solely on an earlier decision by the Arizona Supreme Court approving the use of a videotaped deposition of an unavailable witness in a
1 24
criminal prosecution.
In that earlier decision, State v. Reid,1 25 the Arizona Supreme
Court found that the trial court had properly admitted the videotaped testimony of a pathologist at the defendant's trial for murder.1 26 The pathologist, who had examined the body of the murder
victim, was scheduled to be out of the country at the time of trial. 27
The Reid opinion stressed that the pathologist's testimony related
primarily to purely foundational matter.1 2a The supreme court ex120.

See State v. Melendez, 135 Ariz. 390, 661 P.2d 654 (Ct . App. 1982) (Admission

of videotaped deposition of child sex abuse victim at trial did not violate the defendant's right
to confrontation.); State v. Lee, 277 Ark. 142, 639 S.W.2d 745 (1982) (Arkansas videotape

statute mandates admission of videotaped deposition of child sex abuse victim at trial in lieu of
live testimony once it has been made.); Washington v. State, 452 So. 2d 82 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1984) (Florida videotape statute construed not to require expert testimony to establish
need to videotape child's testimony.); Tolbert v. State, 697 S.W.2d 795 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985)
(Admission of videotape of interview of social service worker with child sex abuse victim not
violative of defendant's right to confrontation since statute provides that both the child victim
and third party interviewer may be called by either party to testify at trial.); Alexander v.
State, 692 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (same); Jolly v. State, 681 S.W.2d 689 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1984) (same); Long v. State, 694 S.W.2d 185 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (Provision of Texas

videotape statute allowing tape of child victim's conversation with a third party interviewer
into evidence at trial held to be prima facie unconstitutional.).
121.
122.

135 Ariz. 390, 661 P.2d 654 (Ct. App. 1982).
ARIz. RaV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-2311 to -2312 (1978).

123.

135 Ariz. at 392, 661 P.2d at 656.

124. State v. Reid, 114 Ariz. 16, 559 P.2d 136 (1976).
125. Id.

126.
127.

Id. at 29, 559 P.2d at 149.
Id. at 27, 559 P.2d at 147.

128. Id. at 28, 559 P.2d at 148.
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pressly reserved decision on the question of whether the videotaped
testimony of the victim of a crime could be admitted into evidence at
the defendant's trial on those charges consistent with the right to
confrontation.1 29 In fact, the language of the opinion strongly suggests that the court would have decided differently if that had been
the case. 130 Despite this apparent limitation, the court in Melendez
had no difficulty in concluding that the admission of the videotaped
deposition of the child victim was consistent with the rationale of
3
Reid.' '
The Melendez court ignored the Reid court's hesitance to approve the use of videotaped testimony of such a crucial witness as
the defendant's alleged victim. Instead, it focused on language in the
Reid opinion setting forth a balancing test to be used by the trial
court in determining the propriety of admitting videotaped testimony.132 The Reid court instructed trial courts to weigh the defendant's right to confrontation against the extent of the need of the witness to be away at the time of trial.1 33 The supreme court stated that
such factors as the witness' occupation and the nature of his testimony were relevant in striking this balance. 3 However, the Reid
court concluded that a witness should not be permitted to testify via
videotape if his absence would be prejudicial to the defendant or
prosecution.13 5 Absent a showing of prejudice or lack of good faith,
the supreme court held that admission of such testimony was within
the discretion of the trial court. 36
The Melendez court found no abuse of discretion by the trial
court in balancing the competing interests of the defendant and the
child victim in that case. The court noted that a clinical psychologist
had testified "to the likelihood that [the child] would become uncommunicative if called to testify" at trial 37 and that the child had
expressed fear at the thought of testifying before a jury. 38 The court
further noted that both the defendant and his counsel were present
at the taping and that the defendant had an opportunity to cross129.

Id. at 29, 559 P.2d at 149.

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id.
Melendez, 135 Ariz. at 392-93, 661 P.2d at 656-57.
Id. at 392, 661 P.2d at 656.
Reid, 114 Ariz. at 29, 559 P.2d at 149.
Id.

Id.
Id.
Melendez, 135 Ariz. at 392, 661 P.2d at 656.

Id.
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examine the child. 13 9 The court concluded that the defendant's constitutional right of confrontation was not violated by the trial court's
use of "modern technology to meet the special needs of [the] wit140
ness" under the circumstances.
The Melendez opinion did not expressly apply the Supreme
Court's Ohio v. Roberts test1 41 for determining whether the hearsay
statements of an unavailable witness were admitted into evidence at
trial in violation of the defendant's sixth amendment right to confrontation. Rather, the court viewed the decision to admit the videotape of the child's testimony as being totally within the discretion of
the trial court, and refused to overturn the trial court's decision absent a showing of prejudice or lack of good faith.1 42 While the
court's decision to tape the child's testimony and allow its admission
into evidence at trial may have been correct, a better approach
would have been for the court to set forth more explicit guidelines to
be used by trial courts in determining whether the admission of such
testimony at trial is constitutionally permissible.
B.

Are Videotaped Depositions of Child Sex Abuse Victims
Constitutionally Admissible Hearsay?

1. Unavailability. - Under the Court's "approach" in Ohio v.
Roberts, 43 the videotaped testimony of a child sex abuse victim is
constitutionally admissible hearsay only if the prosecution first establishes that the child is unavailable to testify at trial.1 44 The Federal
Rules of Evidence and most state evidence codes provide that a witness can be found unavailable to testify at trial due to a "then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity.11 45 If such an infirmity
or illness is established to the satisfaction of the court, and the witness' testimony was given at a prior trial, preliminary hearing, or
deposition, and the party against whom the testimony is offered "had
an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct,
cross, or redirect examination," the prior recorded testimony is ad1 46
missible at trial despite the unavailability of the witness.
The burden of proving that a hearsay declarant is unavailable
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 393, 661 P.2d at 657.
Id.
See supra text accompanying note 110.
Melendez, 135 Ariz. at 392-93, 661 P.2d at 656-57.
448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980).
Id.
See, e.g., FED. R. EviD. 804(a)(4) (emphasis added).

146.

FED. R. EVID.804(b)(1).
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as a witness is on the prosecution.1 4 In assessing whether or not a
witness is unavailable to testify at trial due to mental illness or infirmity, courts generally require expert medical testimony to establish
the existence of such a condition. 148 The cases suggest that the expert's evidence must demonstrate that the existing mental infirmity
renders the witness unable to testify at trial due to the likelihood of
severe, perhaps permanent, injury if the witness is forced to testify in
open court.1 49 The sufficiency of the proof necessary to establish witness unavailability is generally within the discretion of the trial
court.150 Case law indicates that the prosecution has the burden of
proof by a preponderance of the evidence on the issue of
unavailability.151
In Warren v. United States, 52 the defendants appealed their
convictions on multiple counts, including armed rape, and argued
that their right to confrontation had been violated by the admission
at their second trial of the prior trial testimony of one of their victims. 1 53 The defendants claimed that the trial court erred in admitting the victim's prior trial testimony because the prosecution had
not introduced enough evidence to support a finding of psychological
unavailability. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals disagreed.
Although the court acknowledged that the "precise quantum of evidence" sufficient to meet the witness unavailability standard is difficult to establish,15 4 it pointed out that the standard was clearly met
in this case where both the psychiatrist called by the prosecution and
an independent psychiatrist appointed by the trial court found that
testifying again would cause severe, perhaps permanent, psyclological harm to the witness. 155
147. People v. Stritzinger, 34 Cal. 3d 505, 516, 668 P.2d 738, 746, 194 Cal. Rptr. 431,
439 (1983); People v. Williams, 93 Cal. App. 3d 40, 51, 155 Cal. Rptr. 414, 419 (Ct. App.

1979). See 29 Am.
148.

JUR.

2D Evidence § 750 (1967).

See infra notes 152-71 and accompanying text.

149. See People v. Stritzinger, 34 Cal. 3d 505, 518, 668 P.2d 738, 747, 194 Cal. Rptr.
431, 440 (1983); People v. Williams, 93 Cal. App. 3d 40, 53-54, 155 Cal. Rptr. 414, 420-21
(Ct. App. 1979); People v. Gomez, 26 Cal. App. 3d 225, 230, 103 Cal. Rptr. 80, 83-84 (Ct.
App. 1972).
150. 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 750 (1967).
151. People v. Williams, 93 Cal. App. 3d 40, 51, 155 Cal. Rptr. 414, 419 (Ct. App.
1979).
152. 436 A.2d 821 (D.C. 1981).
153. Id. at 825. Defendants' convictions at their first trial were overturned on appeal for

prejudicial misjoinder. Id. at 824.
154. Id. at 830 n.18.

155. Id. at 828-30. The psychiatrist called by the prosecution reported that,
upon suggestion that [the victim] reconsider the possibility of testifying at a retrial,
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The Warren court noted that only two courts had previously approved this type of witness unavailability. 156 The court pointed out,
however, that both the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Uniform
Rules of Evidence provide for witness unavailability on the grounds
of "mental illness or infirmity. '157 The court proposed the following
factors as guidelines for determining whether a witness is psychologically unavailable to testify: "(1) the probability of psychological injury as a result of testifying, (2) the degree of anticipated injury, (3)
the expected duration of the injury, and (4) whether the expected
psychological injury is substantially greater than the reaction of the
average victim of a rape, kidnapping or terrorist act.""58 The court
stated that these factors should be considered in light of the nature
of the crime and the past psychological history of the witness.1 59
Like the Warren court, the Appellate Division of the New York
Supreme Court, in People v. Lombardi,16 0 admitted the prior trial
testimony of a rape victim on the grounds that there was substantial
evidence that the victim would suffer severe psychological problems
if she was forced to testify at defendant's second trial. The court's
conclusions were based in part on the testimony of the victim's psychiatrist. 61 Apparently the victim's mental health was so seriously
affected by the crime and her appearance at the defendant's first
"the sense of panic and the return of depressive symptoms were so strong that she
could not even conceive of reentering the courtroom or even being questioned in a
more private setting about what she had been through."

Id. at 828-29 n.16. The psychiatrist concluded:
[T]here is great risk in pressuring [the victim] to testify again. She is very likely to
suffer an intensification of the psychological injury she had previously sustained, the
probability of panic states and serious emotional depression being very high. Further, it is likely that should she be forced to testify, the resultant psychological injury would be severely incapacitating over an extended period of time, perhaps even

permanently.
Id. at 829 n.16.
The court appointed psychiatrist found that the victim was "suffering from a narcissistic
personality disorder substantial enough to be considered a mental defect, and [was] vulnerable
to transient psychosis as a result of stress." Id. at 829. The psychiatrist concluded that "'there
would be a small but very real risk that she would become temporarily psychotic as a result of

testifying'
Id.
156.
157.
158.
159.

and that 'in her case the suffering would be greater than one would ordinarily see.'"
Id. at 827.
Id. at 828.
Id. at 830 n.18.
Id.

160. 39 A.D.2d 700, 332 N.Y.S.2d 749 (1972) (per curiam), afd, 33 N.Y.2d 658, 303
N.E.2d 705, 348 N.Y.S.2d 980 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 906 (1974).
161. Id. at 701, 332 N.Y.S.2d at 750.
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trial that she unsuccessfully attempted suicide.'62
Similarly, in People v. Gomez,163 the California Court of Appeals held that in order to establish the unavailability of a witness on
the grounds of mental illness or infirmity the prosecution must show
that the illness or infirmity "exist[s] to such a degree as to render
the witness's attendance, or his testifying, relatively impossible and
not merely inconvenient."'" 4 However, the court declined to specify
the type of illness that must be shown or the degree of severity required, leaving these issues to the discretion of the trial court. 6 5 In
Gomez, two psychiatrists testified regarding the effects an appearance in open court would have on a fifteen-year-old sexual abuse victim who had since been confined to a state hospital with serious
mental disorders. 66
Thus, although courts have been willing to admit prior testimony of rape victims on unavailability grounds where there is compelling evidence of probable psychological harm to the victims if
forced to testify in open court, expert medical testimony seems to be
required to support a finding of psychological unavailability. In a
later case, People v. Williams,' the California Court of Appeals,
relying on Gomez, found that the admission into evidence of the
prior trial testimony of the victim in the defendant's second trial for
rape was erroneous. Despite the testimony of the judge from the first
trial, the police officer who interviewed the victim shortly after the
attack, and two friends of the victim concerning the mental and
physical effects that testifying at the first trial had on the victim, the
court found that there was not an adequate showing of psychological
unavailability. The Williams court assumed that the prosecution had
to demonstrate the witness' unavailability by a preponderance of the
evidence.' 68 The court concluded:
In the absence of medical testimony such as was introduced in
Gomez, there was no credible evidence presented in the case at
bench to support a finding that . . .[the victim] would suffer any
substantial impairment to her mental or physical health - either
permanently or for any significant period of time. 6
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at 701, 332 N.Y.S.2d at 750-51.
26 Cal. App. 3d 225, 103 Cal. Rptr. 80 (Ct. App. 1972).
Id. at 230, 103 Cal. Rptr, at 84.
Id.
Id. at 228-29, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 82-83.
93 Cal. App. 3d 40, 155 Cal. Rptr. 414 (Ct. App. 1979).
Id. at 51, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 419.
Id. at 54, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 421 (emphasis in original).
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Thus, the court found that the victim's "mental, emotional and
physical condition rendered her ability to testify merely inconvenient
and not 'relatively impossible.' "1170 The court emphasized the fact
that the victim's prior symptoms of emotional disturbance after her
prior testimony had subsided and that she now seemed happy. The
court thus concluded that any effects of testifying had only been
temporary in nature. The court found that in light of the fact that
the victim's credibility was a crucial issue in the trial she should not
be excused from testifying in person.17 1
In light of the above decisions, the possibility of severe, perhaps
permanent, mental or emotional injury to the child sex abuse victim
as a result of testifying in open court would render the child unable
to testify at trial on the grounds of a then existing mental illness or
infirmity. In such cases, the child's videotaped testimony should be
admissible at trial under the prior recorded testimony exception to
the hearsay rule. However, the videotape statutes should require the
prosecution to introduce expert medical testimony at the pre-trial
hearing to determine whether the child is likely to be unavailable to
testify at trial. Testimony of family members and others close to the
child and other factors such as the child's age, the nature of the
crime, and the number of times the child will be required to testify
should also be weighed by the court. 17 21 The court should deny the
motion to tape the child's testimony unless the prosecution proves
the likelihood of trial unavailability on the grounds of mental illness
or infirmity by a preponderance of the evidence. A blanket rule allowing the videotaping of the child abuse victim's testimony, without
170. Id. (emphasis in original).
171. Id. at 55, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 421-22. The California Supreme Court relied on the
reasoning in Gomez and Williams in finding that the preliminary hearing testimony of a minor
sex abuse victim was erroneously admitted at defendant's trial for child molestation. People v.
Stritzinger, 34 Cal. 3d 505, 668 P.2d 738, 194 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1983) (en banc). In StritzInger, there was no expert medical testimony that the victim was unable to testify due to an
existing mental infirmity. Id. at 516, 668 P.2d at 746, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 439. The victim's
mother testified that the child was hospitalized and undergoing psychotherapy at the time of
trial. The court acknowledged that neither Gomez nor Williams explicitly require expert medical testimony for a finding of unavailability under the state's evidence code. Id. at 518, 668
P.2d at 747, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 440. Nevertheless, such expert medical testimony is required, in
order to determine that the "existing ...mental illness or infirmity" renders the witness
unable to testify. Id. Such a determination, the court reasoned, would require expert testimony
"as to the likely effect of the court appearance on the . . . health of the witness." Id. The
court concluded that "[t]he mother's understandably protective testimony was therefore insufficient as a matter of law for this critical purpose." Id. at 518, 668 P.2d at 747, 194 Cal. Rptr.
at 440.
172. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 967.041(3) (West Supp. 1985).
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a prerequisite finding that testifying in open court would result in
unusually severe emotional or mental trauma is probably unconstitutional. As one observer has noted, "'[amny court proceeding is trau17 3
matic' for every victim. ?
Requiring the prosecution to prove unavailability by a preponderance of the evidence will facilitate the courts' efforts to reconcile
society's desire to accommodate the special needs of some child victims and the defendant's constitutionally guaranteed right to confrontation. The prosecution will most likely be required to introduce
expert medical testimony regarding the risk of injury to the child,
rather than relying solely on the testimony of understandably protective family members and friends. As a result, the child's testimony
would be taped only if the prosecution demonstrates a real need for
such a protective procedure in each case.
A preponderance of the evidence standard is also consistent with
the Supreme Court's decisions concerning the burden of proof the
prosecution must meet when the admissibility of evidence offered
against a defendant at a criminal trial is challenged on constitutional
grounds. The Supreme Court has rejected the argument that such
evidence must be found admissible beyond a reasonable doubt in order to adequately safeguard the values exclusionary rules are
designed to protect. 174 For example, in Lego v. Twomey,17 5 the Court
held that at a pre-trial suppression hearing to determine the voluntariness of the defendant's confession, the prosecution is required to
prove, by only a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant's
confession was voluntary. 7M Likewise, in United States v. Matlock,1 77 the government had the burden of proving that, when the
police searched a defendant's bedroom without a warrant, they were
justified in relying on the consent of a woman who claimed to occupy
the premises jointly with the defendant. Proof of voluntary consent
to the search by the defendant or a third party with common authority over the premises was necessary in order for the evidence seized
to be admissible at the defendant's trial for bank robbery. 78 The
Court stated that the degree of the government's burden of proof on
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Galante, supra note 1, at 28, col. 4 (emphasis in original).
Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 487 (1972).
Id. at 477.
Id. at 489.
415 U.S. 164 (1974).
See id. at 170-72.
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this issue was proof by a preponderance of the evidence. 179 The
Court opined that "the controlling burden of proof at suppression
hearings should impose no greater burden than proof by a preponderance of the evidence."18 0 In Lego, however, the Court noted that
states were free to adopt a stricter standard to govern the admission
of such evidence in their own courts.18'
Just as a confession or evidence obtained through a search without a warrant and without probable cause cannot be introduced at
trial without a showing of voluntariness or consent, respectively, the
prior recorded testimony of a witness is not constitutionally admissible at a criminal trial absent a showing of the unavailability of the
witness.18 2 In all three situations important constitutional protections
are implicated.18 3 The Supreme Court has held that a preponderance
of the evidence standard is constitutionally permissible in determining the admissibility of confessions and evidence seized as a result of
a warrantless search.8 4 There seems to be no reason to require a
higher standard of proof regarding the likely unavailability of the
child sex abuse victim at the time of trial.
The Court in Lego noted that the exclusionary rules were
designed to curb constitutionally offensive conduct on the part of police. 18 5 The Court concluded that it was doubtful that imposing a
higher burden of proof on the prosecution in this instance would result in a sufficiently greater adherence to constitutional standards by
the police in order to justify excluding such evidence from the jury's
consideration in determining the defendant's guilt or innocence. 86
The purposes of the confrontation clause are to ensure that the witness' testimony is given under oath, in the presence of the jury, and
is subject to cross-examination by the defendant.8 7 These safeguards
179. Id. at 177.
180. Id. at 178 n.14.
181. 404 U.S. at 489.
182. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(1).
183. The introduction of coerced confessions at trial violates the defendant's fifth
amendment right against self incrimination, U.S. CONsT. amend. V; warrantless searches absent probable cause or voluntary consent violate the defendant's fourth amendment right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures, US. CONsT. amend. IV; and the introduction of
prior recorded testimony at trial absent proof of the witness' unavailability violates the defendant's sixth amendment right to be confronted with his accusers, US. CONsT. amend. VI.
184. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S.
164 (1974); Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972).
185. 404 U.S. at 489.
186. Id.
187. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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are believed to affect the veracity of witnesses, thus protecting the
defendant from unreliable and untrustworthy testimony. Admitting
videotaped testimony of child sex abuse victims where the prosecution has proved the likelihood of unavailability at the time of trial by
a preponderance of the evidence would not undermine these purposes. Imposing a higher burden of proof on the prosecution would
not enhance protections for the defendant to a degree sufficient to
outweigh society's interest in protecting child sex abuse victims from
the danger of severe psychological injury. At the videotaping session,
the child will be sworn and subject to the defendant's cross-examination. In addition, unlike a written transcript of prior trial or preliminary hearing testimony, a videotape affords the jury some demeanor
evidence.1 8 Thus, there seems to be no reason to conclude that the
Constitution requires the prosecution to establish the unavailability
of the child victim witness by a more exacting standard than a preponderance of the evidence.
Once the child's testimony is taped, the unavailability of the
child witness should be presumed to continue at the time of trial.189
In order to justify such a continuing presumption, the taping of the
child's testimony should not occur too far in advance of trial. The
elapse of only a short time between the taping and the trial will
make it most unlikely that circumstances have changed sufficiently
to require a new hearing on the issue of unavailability. Therefore, in
a case like State v. Melendez,190 where the trial followed the taping
by only a week, absent extraordinary circumstances, the presumption
of continued unavailability should apply and no new findings need to
be made on this issue by the trial court. However, in the unlikely
event that information comes to light indicating that the child's
mental or emotional condition has improved sufficiently since the
time of the taping to allow in court testimony, the prosecutor or defendant may make a motion to the court to hear further evidence on
the issue of the child's unavailability. This motion should be granted
if the court determines there is good cause to hold a new hearing. At
this second hearing, new examinations of the child should be required by each side's experts, and testimony should relate to such
188.
189.

Contra infra notes 230-31 and accompanying text.
Cf. 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1414 (Chadbourn rev. 1974) (asserting that where

the cause for taking a pre-trial deposition is likely to be permanent, the cause should be presumed to continue at the time of trial and that the burden should be placed on the opponent to

show that the cause has ceased).
190.

135 Ariz. 390, 392, 661 P.2d 654, 656 (Ct. App. 1982).
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factors as the nature and extent of the child's recovery from the attack, and the danger that requiring in court testimony would pose
for the child's continued recovery.
2.

Reliability. -

Under the second step of the Roberts test, 191

the hearsay statement of an unavailable witness must bear certain
"indicia of reliability" to be admissible at trial. 92 If the evidence
falls into a "firmly rooted hearsay exception," reliability can be inferred.'9 3 If not, the evidence must be excluded absent indications of
its trustworthiness. The hearsay exception for prior recorded testimony when the declarant is unavailable to testify at trial due to illness is a "firmly rooted hearsay exception," and thus, admission of
videotaped testimony pursuant to this exception to the hearsay rule
satisfies the reliability prong of the Roberts test.
In Roberts, the Supreme Court rejected the defendant's assertion that the Court must "undertake a particularized search for 'indicia of reliability'" before admitting the preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable witness at trial under the prior recorded
testimony exception to the hearsay rule. 95 Rather, the Court held
that the "accouterments of the preliminary hearing itself" - the
fact that the witness testified under oath, that the defendant was
repiesented by counsel, that the defendant had an opportunity to
cross-examine the witness, and that the proceeding was held before a
judicial tribunal - provided sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness. 9 6 Videotaped testimony of child sex abuse-victims recorded at
a proceeding conducted pursuant to the Arizona, Kentucky, and
Texas statutes, where the defendant is kept out of the view of the
child during questioning 17 arguably would not satisfy this standard
since it would deprive the defendant of a face-to-face encounter with
his accuser while the child is testifying.
Courts addressing the question of whether the use of videotaped
depositions at trial violates the confrontation clause have been concerned with preserving the defendant's right to a face-to-face meet191. 448 U.S. at 66.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 72.
196. Id. at 73. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165 (1970).
197. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4253(B) (Supp. 1985); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
421.350(4) (Bobbs-Merrill Supp, 1984); TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 38.071, § 4
(Vernon Supp. 1986).
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ing with the witness. For example, in United States v. Benfield,198
the defendant appealed his conviction for misprison of felony, arguing that his sixth amendment right to confrontation was violated by
admission into evidence of a videotaped deposition of the alleged kidnap victim. The defendant watched on a monitor while the victim's
testimony was videotaped in another room. He had access to a
buzzer that he could use to halt the questioning and summon his
counsel for conference. 199 The government claimed that the witness
was unable to testify in the defendant's presence because of psychiatric problems resulting from her kidnapping. 00 The court noted
that in fact it appeared that the witness was deceived as to the defendant's presence in the building where she was being questioned
and as to his ability to hear her testify.201 The Eighth Circuit, deciding the case prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Ohio v. Roberts,2 °2 relied primarily on the Court's earliest confrontation decisions 203 in concluding that the right to confrontation "normally"
included a "face-to-face meeting at trial at which time cross-examination takes place. ' 20 4 The court noted that such an encounter is
believed to have an effect on the veracity of the witness.20 5 The court
recognized that the right to confrontation is not absolute and can be
waived by the defendant voluntarily or otherwise.206 The court argued, however, that these narrow exceptions to the necessity for the
defendant's presence while witnesses against him are testifying
207
should not be expanded unnecessarily.
The Benfield court left open the question of whether a witness
might be excused from testifying in the defendant's presence due to
the brutal nature of the alleged offense, finding that the defendant's
198.

593 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1979).

199.

Id. at 817.

200. Id. The Eighth Circuit noted, however, that:
The Government made only a marginal showing of [the victim's] unavailability at
trial. No new evidence of her condition was presented. Instead, the Government

relied on the failure of [the psychiatrist] to notify them of any improvement in her
condition. An additional showing of the witness's mental condition and availability

on the trial date would have been a much better practice.
Id. at 817 n.4.
201. Id. at 820-21.
202. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).

203. See Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325 (1911); Kirby v. United States, 174
U.S. 47 (1899); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
204.
205.
206.
207.

Benfield, 593 F.2d at 821.
Id.
Id. at 819-20.
Id. at 821.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1985

31

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 11
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:261

conduct in this case did not warrant such an excusal. 2°s In a footnote,209 the court noted that an Arizona case, State v. Ritchey,210
held that a trial court could examine the competency of a sevenyear-old child abuse victim outside the defendant's presence. The
Benfield court noted, however, that in Ritchey, there was no indication that the child's testimony was given outside the defendant's
presence. 2n1 Although disapproving the procedure employed in this
case, the Benfield court did not prohibit the use of videotaped testimony at trial. The court suggested that its decision might have been
different if the procedure had "more nearly approximate/d the
'212
traditionalcourtroom setting.
The court in Warren v. United States,213 which upheld the admission of the prior trial testimony of a rape victim at trial on the
grounds of unavailability due to mental illness or infirmity, distinguished the result in Benfield. The Warren court noted that the Benfield court did not object to the finding of unavailability, but rather
reversed on reliability grounds because there was no face-to-face
meeting between the defendant and the victim.2"
The necessity for face-to-face confrontation during questioning
of the witness was also recently addressed in a similar context in a
California case, Herbert v. Superior Court.215 In Herbert, the defendant was charged with oral copulation with a child and lewd acts
upon a child. In response to the five-year-old victim's reluctance to
testify, the seating in the courtroom at the preliminary hearing was
rearranged so that the defendant could not see the child while she
testified and she could not see him. However, the defendant and the
judge, the judge and the witness, and the defendant and both counsel
were in view of each other.21 6 The court held that this arrangement
217
violated the defendant's constitutional right to confrontation:
The historical concept of the right of confrontation has included the right to see one's accusers face-to-face, thereby giving

the fact-finder the opportunity of weighing the demeanor of the ac208. Id. at 821-22.
209. Id. at 821 n.10.
210.
211.
212.
213.

107 Ariz. 552, 490 P.2d 558 (1971).
Benfield, 593 F.2d at 821 n.10.
Id. at 821 (emphasis added).
436 A.2d 821, 828 (D.C. 1981).

214. Id.
215.

117 Cal. App. 3d 661, 172 Cal. Rptr. 850 (Ct. App. 1981).

216. Id. at 665, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 851.
217.

Id. at 671, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 855.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol14/iss1/11

32

Clark-Weintraub: The Use of Videotaped Testimony of Victims in Cases Involving Chi
19851

VIDEOTAPED TESTIMONY

cused [sic] when forced to make his or her accusation before the
one person who knows if the witness is truthful. A witness's reluctance to face the accused may be the product of fabrication rather
than fear or embarrassment. 18
In light of these decisions, it appears that the reliability prong
of the Roberts test is not satisfied if the defendant is not permitted
to be physically present within the child's view while the child is
testifying. The Supreme Court's decisions holding that admission of
preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable witness at trial is
constitutional require that the defendant have an adequate opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the preliminary hearing. An adequate opportunity for cross-examination requires the defendant's
full participation in the questioning of the witness. 219 Arguably, such
full participation is lacking where the defendant is forced to view the
child's questioning from behind one-way glass.
Thus, a videotape procedure like that allowed in Arizona, Kentucky, and Texas, where the defendant is kept out of the view of the
child while the latter is testifying, 220 would probably be found unconstitutional. Although legislators and prosecutors understandably wish
to spare the child victim the trauma of refacing his or her attacker,
singling out accused child molesters for special treatment clearly deprives these defendants of their sixth amendment rights and jeopardizes the rights of wrongfully accused persons. While the child
would probably suffer less trauma if questioned outside the defendant's presence, being questioned prior to trial in the judge's chambers instead of in open court would lessen the child's trauma while
preserving the defendant's constitutional protections.
CONCLUSION

As the number of prosecutions for sexual abuse of children
grows, an increasing number of children are subjected to the ordeal
of testifying against their alleged attackers. The desire to spare these
young victims as much trauma as possible, while bringing their alleged attackers to justice, is understandable. The recently enacted
videotape statutes operative in cases involving sexual abuse of young
children represent a necessary accommodation between the public's
218. Id.
219. Benfield, 593 F.2d at 821.
220. AIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4253(B) (Supp. 1985); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
421.350(4) (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1984); TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 38.071, § 4
(Vernon Supp. 1986).
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interest in protecting the welfare of these young victims and the defendant's constitutional protections.
In order to comply with the Supreme Court's Ohio v. Roberts2 21
decision, the trial court should not order that the child's testimony
be taped unless the prosecution can demonstrate at a pre-trial hearing that the child is likely to be unable to testify at trial because of
the danger of severe, perhaps permanent, emotional or mental injury.
Only two videotape statutes, Colorado's2 22 and Wisconsin's,22 3 provide some guidance to the trial court regarding what factors should
be considered in determining whether a child witness is unavailable
to testify at trial; neither mandates the introduction of expert medical testimony on the issue. Expert medical testimony is necessary if
the court is to make a knowledgeable determination regarding the
likelihood of harm to the child from testifying in open court. Such
testimony should prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
child is unable to testify at trial due to the likelihood of psychological injury. The pre-trial hearing on the issue of unavailability should
be held as close as possible to the start of the trial. The child's unavailability should thus be presumed to continue at the time of trial.
In the unlikely event that the child's psychological condition improves to such a degree that in court testimony is possible without
danger of severe psychological injury to the child, the prosecutor or
the defendant may make a motion requesting a new determination
on this issue.
In order to satisfy the second prong of the Roberts test, the defendant should be physically present within the child's view while the
child testifies. The right to cross-examine witnesses is the essential
right protected by the confrontation clause. The defendant's physical
presence within the child's view at the time of questioning is part of
this right of cross-examination. If a defendant is forced to view the
testimony of his accuser from behind one-way glass, his right to
cross-examine a crucial witness is impaired merely because of the
crime of which he is accused. Such a procedure is unconstitutional.
Thus, while procedures like those adopted by Arizona,2 24 Kentucky, 228 and Texas 22 6 are understandable from a humanitarian point
221. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
222. CoLO. REv. STAT. § 18-3-413(3) (Supp. 1984).
223. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 967.041 (West Supp. 1985).
224.

ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4252(B) (Supp. 1985).

225. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.350(4) (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1984).
226. TEX. CRIM. PaOC. CODE ANN. art. 38.071, § 4 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
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of view, they deny the defendant an essential aspect of his sixth
amendment rights.
If appropriate guidelines are followed, the defendant's constitutional right to confrontation will not be violated. Videotaped testimony taken in accordance with this suggested procedure would satisfy the major purposes behind the confrontation clause. As noted
earlier, the right to confrontation serves three major purposes: (1) to
insure that testimony against the accused is given under oath; (2) to
give the defendant an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses
against him; and (3) to allow the jury to observe the witness' demeanor while testifying. 227 Thus, child victims testifying on videotape should be sworn as witnesses and examined to determine competency. The defendant should be given an adequate opportunity to
cross-examine the child at the videotape proceeding. One could argue that such an opportunity for cross-examination at a pre-trial
hearing does not adequately protect the defendant because the introduction of the videotaped testimony at trial in lieu of live testimony
deprives the defendant of the opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the context of what transpires at the actual trial.228 This argument need not be fatal to the constitutionality of such videotaped
testimony, however. If a situation arises where evidence is introduced
at trial that was unknown at the time the child's testimony was
taped, the judge can call the child for further questioning. 229
Regarding the ability of the jury to observe the witness' demeanor, a videotape deposition would seem to clearly satisfy this
purpose of confrontation. Some commentators, however, have
pointed out that the camera may not be the neutral player many
assume it to be.2 30 A camera focused on a witness necessarily limits
the jury's ability to observe. The camera may fail to transmit subtle
changes in the witness' coloring or body language that occur while
the witness is testifying. 231 Although such criticisms are undoubtedly
valid, it is clear that a videotaped deposition provides the jury with
some demeanor evidence, and is certainly preferable in this respect
to the reading of a preliminary hearing or prior trial transcript. As
227. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
228. See Libai, supra note 4, at 1029-30.
229. Id.
230. See generally Note, The Testimony of Child Victims In Sex Abuse Prosecutions:
Two Legislative Innovations, 98 HARv. L. REv. 806, 822-24 (1985); Note, The Criminal
Videotape Trial: Serious Constitutional Questions, 55 OR. L. REV. 567 (1976) (discussing
deficiencies of videotaped testimony as opposed to live testimony).
231. See Note, OR. L. REV., supra note 230, at 574-77.
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long as the court is satisfied that the video equipment was in proper
working order and that the camera was not utilized to influence the
appearance of the child and thereby evoke the jurors' sympathy, the
tape should be admitted at trial. Used properly, such a procedure
accommodates the needs of child sex abuse victims without unnecessarily jeopardizing the defendant's constitutional rights.
Deborah Clark-Weintraub
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